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Abstract 
With the recent advances in Internet-of-thing devices (IoT), cloud-based services, and 
diversity in the network data, there has been a growing need for sophisticated anomaly 
detection algorithms within the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) that can 
tackle advanced network threats. Advances in Deep and Machine learning (ML) has 
been garnering considerable interest among researchers since it has the capacity to 
provide a solution to advanced threats such as the zero-day attack. An Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) is the first line of defense against network-based attacks 
compared to other traditional technologies, such as firewall systems. This report adds to 
the existing approaches by proposing a novel strategy to incorporate both supervised 
and unsupervised learning to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Specifically, the study 
will utilize deep Autoencoder (DAE) as a dimensionality reduction tool and Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) as a classifier to perform anomaly-based classification. The 
study diverts from other similar studies by performing a thorough analysis of using deep 
autoencoders as a valid non-linear dimensionality tool by comparing it against Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and tuning hyperparameters that optimizes for 'F-1 Micro' 
score and 'Balanced Accuracy' since we are dealing with a dataset with imbalanced 
classes. The study employs robust analysis tools such as Precision-Recall Curves, 
Average-Precision score, Train-Test Times, t-SNE, Grid Search, and L1/L2 
regularization. Our model will be trained and tested on a publicly available datasets 
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Intrusion Detection System  
 The idea of the Intrusion detection system (IDS) as the first line of defense   
against network intrusion can be traced back to Dorothy Denning's seminal paper 
named 'An Intrusion-Detection Model' where she first proposed a model for a real-time 
detection system capable of detecting various forms of threats [1]. Since then, the IDS 
has come a long way especially with the recent advancements in machine learning, big 
data, and an industry-wide shift to the cloud.  
Intrusion detection systems can be divided into variants depending on its 
detection method. The first one follows the signature-based detection technique and the 
second follows an anomaly-based detection technique. An IDS that follows the 
intrusion-based technique matches up the signature of a potential threat against its 
database of known attacks and decides accordingly. Under the anomaly-based scheme, 
IDS are rigorously trained on learning normal traffic flow patterns using machine 
learning algorithms which allows the IDS to detect abnormal traffic.  
The shortcoming of a signature-based IDS is its inability to catch threats that are 
not known beforehand since it heavily relies upon its database of known attacks. The 
signature-based detection method has been widely popular because of its high 
precision rates and low memory consumption [2]; however, attacks have been 
becoming more sophisticated over the years. Threats such as zero-day attacks are not 
publicly known before infecting a host system or organization. Attacks of such nature 
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can wreak havoc since it takes advantage of the required time it takes to patch up an 
IDS against that threat.   
On the other hand, the anomaly-based detection method performs better against 
zero-day since it is trained on good traffic flow and can detect an anomalous pattern. 
One criticism of the detection method in question would be its high false-positive and 
high memory consumption which is required in the training phase of the detection 
algorithm. Solving this challenge would be one of the main themes of this study.  
Machine Learning Algorithms  
There has been a growing interest in the use of machine learning (ML) 
algorithms to catch anomalies since they are considerably better than traditional 
classification algorithms [3]. The use of these advanced algorithms has played an 
important role in increasing precision in detecting anomalies. Various machine learning 
algorithms such as Random Forest (RF) [4], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [4], K-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [5], and Naïve Bayes have been utilized to optimize the 
anomaly-based systems.  
At its core, anomaly detection is a classification problem. The machine learning 
algorithms generally do an excellent job of catching threats, but there is an added 
computational cost, which is a challenge for cybersecurity experts since anomalies must 
be dealt with in real-time scenarios. In addition, with the advent of edge computing, 
building an algorithm that is not heavy on computational power is becoming even more 
crucial.  
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To tackle these issues, the recent implementation of deep learning, a subfield of 
ML, in anomaly-based detection methods have been quite promising. Neural nets allow 
for more robust and thorough learning on inputs owing to its rigorous utilization of 
optimization techniques based on neural networks. Neural Nets are further built on 
principles from calculus, linear algebra, and probability.  
The most basic structure of a neural net is composed of three layers: an input 
layer, hidden layer, outer layer. Neural networks containing 2 or more hidden layers are 
considered Deep Neural Networks [6]. Hidden layers in the neural architecture enable 
backpropagation which allows the neural nets to iteratively adjust the associated 
weights and biases of a given neuron by comparing it against the outcome labels.  
There are many hyperparameters within a given neural network scheme which 
can be adjusted so that it can govern the way the model is trained on the input data. 
One of the distinguishing hyperparameters is Learning Rate, Epochs, Hidden Layers, 
Neurons, and Activation Function1.  
KDDCUP99 and NSL-KDD Dataset  
The KDDCUP99 dataset was prepared and developed by the MIT Lincoln Lab in 
the year 1998 under the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program [7]. The 
dataset contains 'bad' and 'good' connections acquired through nine weeks of raw TCP 
dump of a military network environment. Various studies have performed anomaly-
 
 
1 The definition of each of these terms are provided in Chapter IV- Definition of Terms.  
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based modeling on this dataset to gauge their system's performance [8]. Even though 
there are over 37 attacks in the dataset, they can be broadly categorized in five as four 
attack types which can be seen in table 1. However, the KDDCUP99 dataset has 
several issues such as the redundancy of records owing to the synthetic nature of the 
data. This issue can cause statistical errors since being trained on redundant data can 
cause the model to be biased towards the frequent records [8]. Because of this reason, 
we will be implementing our proposed anomaly detection method on the enhanced 
NSL-KDD dataset which addresses the previously mentioned issue. Our study will focus 
on this dataset to gauge the accuracy of our proposed algorithms. Our study will 
evaluate the dataset as both a binary (Attack/Normal) and multi-class.  
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Table 1  
Attack Types in NSL-KDD Dataset [9] 
Attack Type Description Training Dataset  Testing Dataset 
DoS Denial-of-Service 45927 7456 
Probe Surveillance and other probing 11656 2421 
R2L Unauthorized access from a remote machine 995 2756 
U2R Unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges 52 200 
 
Problem Statement 
There are potential threats within the network traffic that can compromise a target 
application or computer. Some well-known attacks that can hinder a legitimate user 
from accessing system resources are DOS attacks that can flood your system with 
connection requests, thus rendering your host machine useless. MITM (Man-In-The-
Middle) attacks intercept network communication in order to listen in on the exchange of 
information. Spoofing attacks attempt to mimic an authorized user so that they can 
convince the system to provide access to the attacker. It does so by sending IP packets 
from a known Host. User to Root Attack (U2R) bypasses the system security by gaining 
access through the network option. Application layer attacks exploit the lapses within 
the application layer, so there might be a security weakness in the server-side.  
However, the most relevant for this study would be unseen attacks. Zero-day 
malware, which is a sophisticated form of attack because there is no known prior 
information regarding the threat. Training the IDS to tackle this form of attack would 
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require a security mechanism that is proficient in distinguishing between normal and 
anomalous network traffic. There is a need to classify the different types of threats 
based on different features that yield higher detection with increase precision and recall 
so that the user can stay protected against the modern network-level attacks. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Malicious threats have the potential to wreak havoc within a system’s 
infrastructure. Therefore, the importance of detecting anomalies within given network 
traffic is crucial [10]. With the recent boom in the volume of data owing to Cloud-based 
services, faster internet speeds, and internet-of-things (IoT) devices, there has been an 
onslaught of more sophisticated attacks that defense mechanisms like Internet Firewall 
are unequipped to handle. The internet speeds have gone up to 100Gbps or more, and 
the data is forecasted to grow to 44 ZB [11]. In addition, because of this surge in 
network data, we are seeing a change in the diversity of data and protocols transmitting 
through the network traffic. If a computer host or application does not have an effective 
intrusion detection system, it could pose a threat to data confidentiality, data integrity, 
and vulnerabilities to denial-of-service (DOS) attacks. 
 The network intrusion threats that are prevalent today can pose a significant risk 
to the operational security of big corporations, governments, and individual users. In the 
past decade, there have been 14 major website breaches, which include attacks on the 
National Assembly, Shinhan Bank, the defense ministry, web sites of presidential blue 
house, New York Stock Exchange, among others. In 2009, a google employee 
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uploaded a malware site that declared the entire Internet to malware for 55 minutes. 
This breach caused a lot of reputational damage to Google as well as financial damage 
from ad revenue lost [2].  
Objective of the Study 
  The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of our 
proposed neural network scheme by measuring the performance against well-known 
performance and classification metrics. The performance we will be using for this study 
is the Precision-Recall curve, F1-micro, Prediction Accuracies, and Matthews 
Correlation Coefficient. It is expected that combining autoencoder-based representation 
learning with an SVM would lower the computational requirements during the train and 
test phase of the model. The lowered computational and storage requirement is 
essential against time-sensitive network threats that an intrusion detection system must 
face.     
Study Questions/Hypotheses 
1. Does employing deep autoencoders as a non-linear dimensionality reduction 
technique lead to better classification metrics than a linear dimensionality reduction 
technique?  
2. Does deep autoencoder provide a better alternative to dimensionality reduction than 
its linear counterparts from a reduced train/test time and memory consumption 
viewpoint?  
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3. Does incorporating the regularization penalty term in our model's loss function 
enhance the model performance? If so, what form of regularization (L1, L2, None) is 
most effective within the proposed neural network scheme?  
Summary  
There has been an extensive number of studies conducted for anomaly detection 
by using supervised machine learning approaches such as KNN (k-nearest neighbor), 
support vector machine and artificial neural networks (ANN) [5]. The combined 
approach of unsupervised deep learning for feature reduction and supervised machine 
learning for classification has been proven to be better in terms of lowered training and 
resource consumption viewpoint. In the coming chapters, we will delve deeper into what 
neural net schemes other researchers have employed to enhance intrusion detection 
systems.  
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature  
Introduction  
 There has been extensive research concerning the implementation of deep 
neural networks within the network intrusion detection system domain. In this section, 
we will explore different scholarly journals that have implemented disparate neural 
network architecture on the KDDCUP99 and the NSL-KDD. In the first section of the 
literature review, we will briefly discuss the inner working of machine learning and 
neural networks in order to understand the calculations being performed in the backend. 
In the later section of the literature review, we will identify various deep learning 
structures utilized for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) for higher accuracy 
and prediction. In the last part of this section, there will be a brief discussion regarding 
how our study deviates from the existing body of research with respect to deep learning 
and anomaly detection.  
Background Related to the Problem 
Deep Learning  
 Deep learning is a subset of machine learning that attempts to model the 
human brain through mathematical functions that imitate the neuron. It finds patterns 
from raw data without the need to be explicitly programmed. The deep learning 
algorithms have been around for decades but it has recently come to the fore owing to 
the plethora that is available in present-day [12]. The architecture of a neural network is 
composed of an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer. Every layer is 
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composed of neurons or a perceptron, which his considered the building block of deep 
learning. Each node connects one neuron with another through successive layers. Each 
neuron imposes weights and biases on the input provided. Then the product sum of 
weights and biases is sent through an activation function so that the output 
accommodates non-linearity, which is crucial when dealing with classification problems. 
For instance, a typical activation function would be the sigmoid function. When an input 
is passed onto the sigmoid function, it collapses the product sum of learned weights into 
a range from 0 to 1. Once the product sum of weights is non-linearized with the 
activation function, we get the output in the output layer. This entire process is called 
feedforward propagation. The output is then measured against the actual value and 
then trained iteratively to minimize the error between the initial prediction and the actual 
value. This iterative process of adjusting the weights and biases of input features is 
known as backpropagation. Backpropagation attempts to perform loss optimization. The 
process of minimizing or optimizing the loss function iteratively is called gradient 
descent. There are many loss functions, but the most used are Cross-Entropy Loss and 
Mean Squared Error Loss (RMSE). In figure 1, we can see the neurons in the input 
layer and its interconnectedness with the subsequent hidden and output layers.  
18 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Neural Network Architecture 
Autoencoders  
 The autoencoder is a neural network that is trained to copy its input to its output 
[13]. The neural network contains two primary mathematical functions that allow the 
input to be reconstructed into output. The encode function  ℎ = 𝑓(𝑥) and the decode 
function 𝑟 = 𝑔(ℎ). h is the internal representation when the input x is being converted to 
r (called reconstruction).  In making the approximate copies of input, the neural network 
learns the most useful properties of the raw dataset. Typically, the h is always a lower-
dimension subspace of the x because of this autoencoder neural networks have a 
bottleneck layer that has a lower number of nodes than the other layers [14].  
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Activation Functions. The 𝑓(. ) and 𝑔(. ) are the activation functions that non-
linearize the bias and weight parameters. There are many variations of activation 
functions that are used within the neural network such as sigmoid, Tanh, and 
ReLU activation functions [14]. Relu, which stands for rectified linear unit, is a 
widely used activation function in deep neural networks [15]. The primary reason 
for the success of this activation function is that it does not require a lot of 
computational resources to execute it compared to complicated activation 
functions that lead to increased difficulty in optimization. Mathematically, ReLU is 
presented as:  
𝑦 = max(0, 𝑥) (1) 
ReLU activation function yields an output of 0 when 𝑥 < 0, and then draws a 
linear line with a slope of 1 when 𝑥 > 0.  
Our paper incorporates the usage of Scaled Exponential Linear Unit (SELU) 
which is one of the newer activation functions being used in deep learning as of now. In 
Self-Normalizing Neural Networks [16], the author posits SELU activation function which 
exhibits as a self-normalizing property which is proven using the Banach fixed-point 
theorem. Essentially, the activations that are closer to zero mean and unit variance 
allows the network layers to converge to zero mean and unit variance [32].  
Having SELU in our scheme is relevant since we will be employing deep 
autoencoders which employ more than three deep layers. Usually, when employing 
more than three layers in a neural architecture which can put the forward neural network 
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at a disadvantage since the lack of normalization within the activation function could 
lead to gradient issues. Since with SELU, the normalization occurs within the function, 
we can bypass that issue and take full advantage of this activation function.  
SELU allows room for deeper network layers owing to its faster processing 
speeds, in addition since the activation encourages normalization there is a presence of 
regularization penalty. In reference to the previously mentioned paper, the authors 
meticulously derived two fixed parameters used in the feedforward process. For 
standard scaled inputs (mean 0, standard deviation 1), the parameters are a=1.6732~, 
and λ= 1.0507 ~. Having fixed parameters our neural network to not backpropagate 
through these variables. SELU can be mathematically presented as: 
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑈(𝑥) =  𝜆 {
𝑥
𝛼𝑒𝑋 − 𝛼
 𝑖𝑓 𝑥>0
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≤0
 (2) 
 
Figure 2: SELU plotted for a=1.6732~, Lambda=1.0507~ 
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Deep Autoencoders as a Dimensionality Reduction Tool. Merely 
reconstructing inputs into an output variable is not considered useful since it does not 
achieve much. However, the true power of autoencoder resides in the internal 
representation of the encoded input x [33]. The lower-dimensional representation allows 
improved performances especially when performing classification tasks. Classifier trains 
faster on lower dimensions due to a lower need for memory and computational power 
[34]. The autoencoder learns by minimizing the following loss function:  
𝐿 (𝑥, 𝑔(𝑓(𝑥))) (3) 
In the equation above, the loss function is penalizing 𝑔(𝑓(𝑥)) for 𝒙. In fact, if the 
decoder function is linear and the L is mean squared error, the resulting subspace is the 
same as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [13]. The autoencoder scheme is 
typically composed of three primary layers. First, the encoder layer, where the inputs 
are assigned weights and biases. Afterward, the inputs are reduced to the most useful 
features in the code layer. As seen in figure 2, the number of neurons in the input layer 
is typically higher than in the ‘code layer.’ Lastly, the decoder layer consists of a 
decoder function that reconstructs the input. However, the code layer contains the latent 
representation of the input vectors which is essential for classification-based tasks. 
When the code layer has a smaller dimension than the input dimension then it is called 
undercomplete [13].  
Autoencoders is a viable non-linear feature reduction technique and tends to 
outperform other dimensionality reduction techniques. Wang, Yao, and Zhao compare 
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autoencoder as a dimensionality reduction algorithm against state-of-the-art 
dimensionality reduction algorithms such as Principal Component Analysis, Linear 
Discriminant Analysis, Locally linear embedding, and Isomap [17]. The study concludes 
that auto-encoders not only outperform other techniques in reducing dimensionality, but 
it is also good at detecting repetitive structures [17]. However, there are other studies 
that give preference to PCA, linear dimensionality reduction technique, for real-world 
tasks as opposed to artificial tasks [18].   
 
Figure 3: Autoencoder (AE) Neural Architecture 
 There are many types of autoencoders such as Sparse, Deep, Denoising [19], 
Convolutional [20], Contractive [21] and variational Autoencoders. The AE that this 
study would be employing deep autoencoders (also named Stacked Autoencoder) [19]. 
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Deep AE has several hidden layers, and deeper stacked AE is considered to have a 
better training capability compared to lesser layers [13] [22].  
Support Vector Machine (SVM)  
Our dataset will be trained using a support vector machine (SVM) for anomaly 
classification on the NSL-KDD dataset. SVM algorithm attempts to find a hyperplane 
(subspace with a dimension that is one less than of its ambient space) that distinctly 
classifies the data points. It does so by making use of support vectors that are points 
closest to the hyperplane (i.e. decision boundary). The hyperplane is positioned such 
which allows the support vectors to sit equidistantly to the hyperplane. The algorithm 
calculates the maximum margin hyperplane which is a margin that yields the highest 
sum between the two support vectors. Mathematically, the algorithm for a binary SVM 
classifier would be represented as follows:  
𝑓(𝑥𝑖) {
≥ 0   𝑦𝑖 =  +1
< 0 𝑦𝑖 =  −1
(4) 
Unlike logistic regression which squashes output of its linear function within the 
range of 0 to 1, SVM squashes its output from the range of -1 to 1. In other words, the 
SVM algorithm classifies the datapoints as negative and positive 1. SVMs are known to 
be effective when working with high dimensional data, even when the number of 
features is higher than the actual number of data points being used. In addition, SVM is 
a flexible classifier in that we can choose among different kernel functions, such as 
linear, polynomial, Radial Basis Function (RBF), sigmoid, and even custom kernels 
using Python. For the purpose of our study, we will choose the RBF kernel since it 
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allows us to perform non-linear classification on our dataset. The radial basis function 
could be mathematically written as such:  
RBF: exp(−𝛾 ∥ 𝑥 − 𝑥′ ∥2) (5) 
Regularization 
In order to ensure that our autoencoder representation contains the highest 
informative weights, we can take advantage of a principle called regularization. 
Essentially, regularization penalizes complexity and encourages simplicity in the training 
model. The way it does so is by adding a regularization term in the loss function of our 
neural network loss function. Having this regularization term in the loss function ensures 
that there is no risk of overfitting. Overfitting typically happens when our model 
overlearns our dataset's training set to the point where it also picks up on the specific 
quirks and outliers. When we incorporate regularization to our neural scheme, we can 
ensure that our model is built to predict unseen data instead of becoming over-trained to 
predict data of the existing training dataset instead of the out-of-sample test set. There 
are various forms of regularization techniques with each having their own advantages 
and disadvantages depending on the nature of the dataset that we are working with. 
There are L1, L2, and L0 regularization terms that are typically employed to penalize 
complexity in each model [23]. For our report, we will use apply all three of these 
regularization techniques and gauge which one (or lack thereof) helps us minimize the 
loss on our testing dataset. Mathematically, L2 regularization could be defined as:  
‖𝑤‖2
2 = 𝑤1
2 + 𝑤2
2 + 𝑤3
2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑛
2 (7)  
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The L2 regularization term quantifies the model complexity by takin the squared 
sum of all the calculated weights. The optimization of the neural network is contingent 
on the minimization of the following loss function and the regularization term:  
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) +  𝜆 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)) (8)  
If the lambda in the above equation is zero, then the regularization term is 
removed completely. Setting the right lambda parameter is important when setting up 
regularization for our model. The lower the lambda value, the more complex the model 
becomes and vice versa. On the other hand, L1 regularization is mathematically defined 
as:  
‖𝑤‖ = |𝑤1| + |𝑤2| + |𝑤3| + ⋯ + |𝑤𝑛| (9)  
Essentially, L2 regularization motivates the model weights to converge around 0 
whereas L1 regularization forces the weights to be exactly 0. Depending on the 
situation, L1 may be better than L2 under certain circumstances. For instance, the model 
that has sparse vectors is better off with L1 regularization since they remove many 
sparse weights thus putting less load on RAM and increasing lowering training and 
testing time. In our report, we will compare both L1 and L2 regularization to gauge which 
scenario leads to desirable outcomes against our classification metrics. 
Literature Related to the Problem  
In Intelligent intrusion detection systems using artificial neural networks [24], the 
authors present a model based on artificial neural networks (ANN), which is a 
supervised deep learning classifier. The study performs the grid search technique and 
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decides on using a multi-layer perceptron with two hidden layers composed of 30 
neurons each. In addition, a 10-fold cross-validation technique was utilized to get more 
robust results. The model yielded a high area under the ROC curve, which indicates 
better classification. The average AUROC came out to be 0.98, SD AUROC 0.02, 
Maximum AUROC 1.00, and Minimum AUROC 0.82.  
Apart from the usage of supervised deep neural nets for training IDS on 
abnormality, there are other deep-learning frameworks that can be adopted. A 
promising approach and one that is the focus of this study would be the Self-taught 
learning (STL) framework, which is essentially composed of two stages. The first stage 
employs unsupervised deep learning for feature and dimension reduction. Whereas in 
the second stage, there is a use of traditional machine learning models for classification. 
The combined usage of both approaches yields results that have shown considerably 
better results than other frameworks based on a study performed by Majjed, Lasheng, 
Al-Habib, and al-Sabahi [25] . According to Majjed et al., this approach is efficient in 
terms of computational cost. In addition, the STL approach contributes to an overall 
increase in detection accuracy compared to other shallow machine learning classifiers.  
A study that closely follows the same methodology named Autoencoder-based 
Feature Learning for Cyber Security Application performs an autoencoder based deep 
learning scheme where the reduced features are then classified based on multiple 
machine learning algorithms [26]. The study draws its data from two main datasets: 
KDDCUP99 Dataset and Malware Classification Dataset published by Microsoft at 
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Kaggle in 2015. The study compares the results with standalone machine learning 
classifiers as well as Autoencoder-based input features. The study indicated that 
Gaussian Naïve Bayes coupled with AE-based features proved to have higher intrusion 
detection accuracy than other deep learning models, such as Xgboost, H20 models, 
among others.  
In a similar vein, Shone, Ngoc, Phai, and Shi combines the use of Non-
symmetric Deep Auto-Encoder (NDAE) with Random Forest (RF). Each NDAE has 
three hidden layers with the same number of neurons in each layer [11]. The primary 
way NDAE stands out from other autoencoders is that it does not follow the typical 
encoder-decoder paradigm, but instead, it just employs the encoder formula in the outer 
layer process, so in that sense, this scheme is considered non-symmetric in nature. The 
scheme is implemented on both the KDDCUP99 and NSL-KDD dataset. The analysis is 
performed as a 5-class KDD classification and 13-class KDD classification. The 
comparisons generated after building the models indicated an improvement of 5% in 
accuracy and training time reduction to 98.1%.  
In the Comparative Study of Deep Learning Models for Network Intrusion 
Detection, the authors posit three main approaches to the anomaly classification 
problem [27]. The first approach is the STL model, which yields an average accuracy of 
98.8% across four classes of anomalies – namely -- DoS, Probe, R2L, and U2R. The 
second approach is based on Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), which considers 
previous lags of input feature which allows for an additional memory input. Having that 
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additional memory input allows adding a temporal dimension to the analysis. However, 
the RNN based on Long Short-term Memory yielded an average accuracy of 79.2%. 
Lastly, the deep neural network approach on the KDD dataset yielded an accuracy of 
66%.   
Summary 
 One can safely surmise that the implementation of a deep learning approach to 
network intrusion detection systems is still in its nascent stages. Given how complex the 
model building process can become given its various configuration (i.e. training, 
optimization, activation, and classification) and other model-specific configurations 
(number of hidden layers, learning rate, loss function) we believe that our approach of 
using deep autoencoders with SVM classifier would prove to be a substantial 
contribution to the existing body of literature on the topic. In the next chapter, we will 
precisely discuss the model building process and the methodology of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction  
 In this section, we will set the bounds of the study by defining the metrics of the 
study. Furthermore, we will address the specifics of the data preprocessing and 
hyperparameter tuning aspect that has been achieved so far in the study.    
Definition of Terms 
• Intrusion Detection System:  An intrusion detection system is a device or 
software application that monitors a network or system for malicious activity or 
policy violations. 
• Network-Level Attacks: Network-delivered threats that typically gain access to 
the internal operating systems. Common types of network attacks are Denial-of-
Service (DOS), spoofing, sniffing, and information gathering. 
• Recall: quantifies the number of positive class predictions made out of all 
positive examples in the dataset 
• Precision: indicates the proportion of correct predictions of intrusions divided by 
the total of predicted intrusions in the testing process 
• Accuracy: indicates the proportion of correct classifications of the total records 
in the testing set 
• F-score: Provides a single score that balances both the concerns of precision 
and recall in one number.  
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• Training and Testing Time: the number of seconds it takes for neural network 
or classifier to train and test respectively on the dataset.  
• Machine Learning: Machine learning is a method of data analysis that 
automates analytical model building. It is a branch of artificial intelligence based 
on the idea that systems can learn from data, identify patterns, and make 
decisions with minimal human intervention. 
• Deep Learning: Deep learning is a subset of machine learning in artificial 
intelligence (AI) that has networks capable of learning unsupervised from data 
that is unstructured or unlabeled. 
• Activation Function: the activation function of a node or neuron defines a 
numerical output by taking input or a set of inputs. 
Data Preprocessing  
During the preprocessing phase of the study, the categorical features within the 
dataset were encoded using one-hot encoder which binarizes the categorical values 
into 0 and 1. The numeric variables were normalized using L2 normalization. 
Sklearn.preprocessing.Normalizer library was used to perform the normalization. 
Normalized numeric inputs are a requirement for many neural network schemes [28]. 
Furthermore, the normalization of numeric inputs helps to avoid outliers that might be 
present in the dataset.  
Hardware and Software Environment 
Operating System: Windows 10 Home 64-bit (10.0, Build 17763)  
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BIOS: X510UAR.309 (type: UEFI) 
Processor: Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-8250U CPU @ 1.60GHz (8 CPUs), ~1.8GHz 
Memory: 8192MB RAM 
DxDiag Version: 10.00.17763.0001 64bit Unicode 
Software Environment: Python 3.7.5 64-bit | Qt 5.9.6 | PyQt5 5.9.2 | Windows 10 
Python Packages: TensorFlow 2.0.0, NumPy 1.17.2, Pandas 0.25.2 
Design and Implementation of the Study  
The study is going to be quantitative, as anomaly detection is essentially a 
classification problem. We have selected deep autoencoders as the first stage for 
dimension reduction and Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier as the second part 
for performing classification on the encoded vector.  
  The number of hidden layers and activation neurons will be contingent on the 
grid search algorithm, which performs hyperparameter tuning and selects parameters 
that optimize the loss function. Instead of utilizing PCA, LDA, or other forms of 
dimension reduction, we will use deep autoencoders as a form of non-linear 
dimensionality reduction [30]. Once we receive the subset vector of reduced features, 
we will employ a support vector machine for the classification process.  
The python libraries that are relevant to the study are Numpy, Pandas, Scikit-
learn and Keras. Python was chosen over other statistical programming languages 
since Python has a broader range of libraries, which makes it an ideal choice for 
performing deep learning analysis. The classification will be performed on binary as well 
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as multi-class labels. The first scenario binarizes the label as a simple normal and 
attack label. Whereas, in the multi-class scenario, we have classified the labels in five 
total attack type labels.  
Tools and Techniques  
Grid search is a technique used for performing hyperparameter tuning. The 
technique provides the optimal hyperparameters by performing an exhaustive search 
through the provided parameter grid. The provided grid for the paper contained the 
following parameters: epochs, loss function, kernel function, activation function, and the 
number of k-folds for cross-validation. K-fold cross-validation allows the user to segment 
the training dataset into multiple folds so that the results are less biased and not 
overfitted. The loss function for the model would be RMSE, which is the square root of 
the average of squared differences between prediction and actual observation. RMSE 
loss function is mathematically presented as   
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =  √
1
𝑛
(𝑌𝑗 + Ῠ𝑗)2  (9) 
Performance Evaluation  
In a two-by-two confusion matrix, the four possible outcomes are as follows:   
1) True Positive (TP): Attack data that is correctly grouped as an attack. 
2) False Positive (FP): Normal data that is incorrectly grouped as an attack. 
3) True Negative (TN): Normal data that is correctly grouped as normal. 
4) False Negative (FN): Attack data that is incorrectly grouped as an attack. 
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Most of the performance metrics that will be discussed are based on these four 
possible outcomes [29]. The concept of classification threshold is tightly linked to 
confusion matrix outcomes since we must define a threshold value that helps us make 
the decision of when to indicate an outcome ‘abnormal’, and ‘normal’.   
Accuracy 
Based on the four measures computed from the confusion matrix, we can 
compute accuracy which is the fraction of the number of correct predictions to the total 
number of predictions. We can formulate accuracy as such:                  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁 
 (10) 
 The accuracy rates would be the key performance indicator for the several 
machines and deep learning classifiers we will be working on throughout the study.  
Precision-Recall Curve 
The precision and recall metrics are very important measures when dealing with 
imbalanced classes. Precision calculates the proportion of positive identifications that 
were correct. It could be mathematically defined as:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 
 (11) 
Recall is defined as the proportion of actual positives correctly identified. It can 
be written as so: 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁 
 (12) 
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Typically, there is a trade-off between precision and recall as the decision 
threshold is adjusted. An increase in the classification threshold always causes the 
recall to decrease or stay the same. Whereas, the increase in classification threshold 
increases the precision [30]. The precision-recall curve shows the inverse relationship 
graphically.  
F-measure 
The F-measure is a single value metric that is based on Precision and Recall. 
The range of the F-measure is between 0 and 1. F-measure allows to take the precision 
and recall into account simultaneously through just one measure as opposed to looking 
at them form a trade-off point of view. The F-measure can be mathematically defined 
as:  
𝐹𝑀 =
(1 + 𝛽1) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
 (13) 
Test and Train Timings 
     The test and train timings are crucial for this study owing to the time-sensitive 
nature of network-level attacks. Therefore, having a model that can train much faster 
than other algorithms would prove to be quite important for our study. 
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Chapter IV: Results 
Visualizing Data using t-SNE 
To visualize our dataset, we employ t-distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding 
(t-SNE) which is a tool for visualizing high-dimensional data. T-SNE employs Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence which is a measure of the difference between two probability 
distributions [31]. KL divergence could be interpreted as a dimensionality reduction 
technique since it converts observations into joint probabilities which lower the overall 
information being processed. However, when dealing with higher dimensional data 
(generally over 50 dimensions), it is recommended to apply prior dimensionality 
reduction technique which would bring manageable subspace that T-SNE can handle 
effectively since it demands a considerable amount of computing power. In addition, 
performing T-SNE on reduced dimensions also manages the noise without distorting the 
interpoint distances. In our situation, we would apply PCA (linear dimensionality 
reduction) and deep autoencoder (non-linear dimensionality reduction) and see how t-
SNE visualizes the reduced dimensions from both the techniques. We were able to 
bring down the initial feature space of 122 inputs to a subspace of 10 dimensions using 
deep autoencoders. We will be using t-SNE to visualize a 2D manifold for our dataset 
with adjustments to different perplexity values. Perplexity can be interpreted as a 
smooth measure of the effective number of neighbors. Generally, the perplexity value 
ranges from 5 to 50. However, when dealing with larger datasets, it is fine to go with 
higher perplexity value. In the following figures, we can see the t-SNE representation of 
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PCA and AE-encoded dimensions with adjusted perplexity and iterations. We can 
observe that both PCA and AE is able to cluster different attack groups in higher 
perplexity and iterations as opposed to lower perplexity and iterations.    
 
Figure 4 t-SNE Representation of Encoded Representation (Perplexity= 50, 
Iterations=500) 
 
Figure 5 t-SNE Representation of Encoded Representation (Perplexity= 100, 
Iterations=500) 
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Figure 6 t-SNE Representation of Encoded Representation (Perplexity= 50, 
Iterations=1000) 
The data points in the figures are color-coded according to five attack classes 
within the NSL-KDD dataset. The vertical and horizontal axis in the graph above is 
generated using the KL-divergence algorithm and is used to embed high-dimensional 
data space into a lower subspace.   
As the perplexity and iterations become higher, we can observe 'normal' class 
data points (red dots) coalescing. A normal class is distinctly separate from the other 
attacks labels which indicate that PCA and DAE are quite effective at separating 
'normal' and 'attack'. However, when focusing on the other four attack class, we see a 
different scenario; except for 'DOS' attack class, we see the other three attack types 
being jumbled together and not forming a clear cluster. The t-SNE representation of 
principal component analysis and deep autoencoder suggest that classifying the other 
three attack types might be challenging to classify.  
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Figure 7 t-SNE Representation of PCA (Perplexity= 50, Iterations= 500) 
 
Figure 8 t-SNE Representation of PCA (Perplexity= 100, Iterations= 500) 
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Figure 9 t-SNE Representation of PCA (Perplexity= 100, Iterations= 1000) 
Grid Search  
In order to choose parameters for our classifier optimally, we employed the 
GridSearchCV available to via scikit-learn which is an open-source machine learning 
library available on Python The GridSearchCV attempts to perform an exhaustive 
search over specified parameter values for our SVM classifier based off against 
important score. For our purpose, we will base our grid search against Micro-recall and 
balanced accuracy.  
Important parameters to consider when working with SVM with RBF kernel 
function is the selection of Gamma and C parameters. C variable is seen as a 
regularization term that keeps sparse variables in check. The optimal parameter 
selection is contingent on the level of noise and balance that the dataset exhibit.  
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 Since our dataset is non-linear, we employed the kernel functions available in the 
scikit-learn python library. We can choose out of four kernel functions –namely—linear, 
polynomial, Radial Basis Function (RBF), and sigmoid. For our analysis, we employed 
'RBF' since our grid search predicted RBF to be the best kernel function in order to 
optimize F1-Micro (Table 2).   
 
Table 2 
Grid Search with 'F1-Micro' Scoring 
F1-Micro Score Std C kernel 
0.704 (+/-0.258) 1 linear 
0.815 (+/-0.011) 1 rbf 
0.781 (+/-0.019) 1 poly 
0.497 (+/-0.017) 10 linear 
0.883 (+/-0.010) 10 rbf 
0.851 (+/-0.013) 10 poly 
0.567 (+/-0.023) 100 linear 
0.928 (+/-0.011) 100 rbf 
0.903 (+/-0.014) 100 poly 
0.665 (+/-0.028) 1000 linear 
0.949 (+/-0.013) 1000 rbf 
0.937 (+/-0.012) 1000 poly 
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Table 3 
Grid Search with 'Balanced Accuracy' Scoring 
Balanced Accuracy Std C kernel 
0.458 (+/-0.035) 1 linear 
0.823 (+/-0.094) 1 rbf 
0.755 (+/-0.081) 1 poly 
0.611 (+/-0.056) 10 linear 
0.841 (+/-0.154) 10 rbf 
0.851 (+/-0.100) 10 poly 
0.66 (+/-0.079) 100 linear 
0.849 (+/-0.126) 100 rbf 
0.875 (+/-0.106) 100 poly 
0.688 (+/-0.109) 1000 linear 
0.828 (+/-0.091) 1000 rbf 
0.845 (+/-0.135) 1000 poly 
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Classification Metrics 
Accuracy, Precision-Recall, F-Score 
In this section, we will closely examine three main models to interpret their 
effectiveness at predicting anomalies as well as the quality of their prediction by looking 
at subtler yet important measures such as precision, recall, and F-score. Simply looking 
at accuracy is not enough to gauge the effectiveness of our model, especially owing to 
the imbalanced label distribution of the NSL-KDD dataset.  
We need to give extra importance in analyzing recall values for the models in 
question since false negatives (Type 1 error) can cause intrusions that could lead to a 
breach in the information system of another individual or organization. To avoid that 
scenario, the recall metric holds considerable importance to us as cybersecurity 
experts.  
It is also important to look at precision, recall, and f1-score values of specific 
attack types, as that will help us understand a finer picture of the model's performance. 
For instance, not having a high recall in 'U2R' attack type would mean potentially giving 
root access information of the system to a hacker. Thus, measuring our models' 
effectiveness against specific attack type would be as important as focusing on the 
overall model, if we intend to build a robust anomaly-based IDS.   
The first model that we will examine would be the standalone SVM model with 
input data that is scaled using L2 normalization. The predictions of the model are 
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generated against an unseen validation set provided in the NSL-KDD. In the binary 
label scenario (Table 4), we find the overall prediction accuracy to be 77%, whereas the 
model yields a weighted average f1-score of 76%.  
Table 4  
Binary Label Classification Report for Standalone SVM 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal 
 
65% 97% 78% 9711 
Attack 
 
97% 61% 75% 12833 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  77% 22544 
Macro Average 
 
81% 79% 77% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
83% 77% 76% 22544 
 
In table 5, we use the same model on a multi-class scenario where attack label is 
further divided into four classes. The overall accuracy as well as weighted f1, recall, and 
precision drop quite significantly when performing multi-label predictions.  
The second model incorporates dimensionality reduction using PCA with similarly 
adjusted SVM. Bearing on the binary data presented in table 6, we observe a reduced 
accuracy and recall of 74 percent. In so far as multiclass labels are concerned, we also 
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observed a decrease in weighted averages (Table 7) for recall, f1-score, precision, and 
overall accuracy compared to the multi-class standalone SVM model.   
Table 5  
Multi-Label Classification Report for Standalone SVM 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal 
 
70% 84% 77% 9711 
DOS  90% 70% 79% 7460 
Probe 
 
59% 62% 60% 2421 
R2L 
 
42% 23% 30% 2885 
U2R 
 
4% 60% 8% 67 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  69% 22544 
Macro Average 
 
53% 60% 51% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
72% 69% 69% 22544 
 
Our proposed model shows considerable increases in accuracy as well as 
average recall rates when handling binary labels (Table 8). Our proposed model does 
far better in terms of weighted averages of precision, recall, and f1-score, as well as 
accuracy, compared to the metrics of the previous two models when working with 
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multiple classes. However, when focusing on U2R, we find that the recall rates are 
considerably higher in the standalone SVM case than it is with our model (Table 9).  
Table 6  
Binary Label Classification Report for PCA+SVM Classifier 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal 
 
63% 96% 76% 9711 
Attack 
 
95% 56% 71% 12833 
  
   
 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  74% 22544 
Macro Average 
 
79% 76% 73% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
81% 74% 73% 22544 
 
Table 7  
Multi-Label Classification Report for PCA+SVM Classifier 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal  61% 55% 58% 9711 
DOS  88% 68% 77% 7460 
Probe 
 
48% 63% 54% 2421 
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R2L 
 
19% 10% 13% 2885 
U2R 
 
1% 52% 2% 67 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  55% 22544 
Macro Average 
 
44% 50% 41% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
63% 55% 58% 22544 
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Table 8  
Binary Label Classification Report for AE-Encoded + SVM Classifier (L2 Regularization) 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal 
 
67% 97% 80% 9711 
Attack 
 
96% 65% 77% 12833 
  
   
 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  78% 22544 
Macro Average 
 
82% 81% 78% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
84% 78% 78% 22544 
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Table 9  
Multi-Label Classification Report for AE-Encoded + SVM Classifier  
 
 
Label 
 
precision recall f1-score support 
      
Normal 
 
71% 89% 79% 9711 
DOS 
 
90% 74% 81% 7460 
Probe 
 
70% 62% 65% 2421 
R2L 
 
50% 23% 32% 2885 
U2R 
 
5% 48% 9% 67 
  
   
 
      
Other Measures 
Accuracy 
 
  73% 
 
22544 
Macro Average 
 
57% 59% 53% 22544 
Weighted Average 
 
74% 73% 72% 22544 
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Precision-Recall Curves  
Another useful way to look at precision and recall metrics would be visualizing it 
through the precision-recall curve. The curve helps us in gauging our classifier's output 
quality. The relationship between precision and recall metric is typically based on a 
tradeoff between one another; this quality is exhibited in the precision-recall curve since 
it plots the two metrics based on various decision boundaries. When we move along the 
curve the decision threshold (AKA classification threshold) decreases, the number of 
false positives increases but false negatives decrease. As a result, precision decreases, 
while recall increases (refer to formulas in the previous chapter).  
Another quality metric to closely examine the precision-recall curve is computing 
the average precision score (AP) which is essentially the weighted mean of precisions 
achieved at each threshold, with the increase in recall from the previous threshold used 
as the weight. Mathematically it is represented as:  
AP = ∑(𝑅𝑛 − 𝑅𝑛−1)𝑃𝑛
𝑛
(14) 
Where R represents recall, P representing Precision, and N representing the nth 
threshold.  One of the important things to look out for when examining precision-recall 
curves is the area beneath it. AP and trapezoidal rules are ways to approximate the 
area beneath the curve. A higher precision-recall curve suggests a high value for both 
the metrics, which is considered important for a robust, valid model. Within this section, 
we will only compare the binary precision-recall curve for scaled, PCA, and DAE 
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encoded datasets which classified using SVM. The precision-recall graphs for other 
algorithms can be found in the appendix section for further examination.  
 
Figure 10 Standalone SVM for Binary Class Precision-Recall Curve 
The graph represents the precision-recall curve for a standalone SVM operating 
on an RBF kernel function. The average precision score is a mere 0.57 which is not a 
desirable outcome for an IDS.  
 
Figure 11 PCA+SVM Binary Class Precision-Recall Curve 
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 The graph presents data relating to PCA encoded inputs coupled with the 
Support Vector Machine classifier. The shape of the curve is relatively outwards facing, 
suggesting an increase in the area beneath the curve compared to the data presented 
in the previous figure. The algorithm receives an AP score of 0.69.  
 
Figure 12 AE+SVM Precision-Recall Curve (Polynomial Kernel) 
This graph clearly shows the precision-recall trade-off that was mentioned at the 
start of this section. We can observe as the decision boundary decreases; the recall 
tends to increase. We can clearly see the area beneath the curve is much greater than 
the two previous graphs of SVM and PCA-SVM respectively. Our proposed model 
receives an AP score of 0.90 which is considerably high.   
We use the models in multiclass but with an extra adjustment of weight 
balancing. It should be noted that because the precision-recall curve is used primarily 
for binary labels, we will be binarizing individual curves for the five classes. Since there 
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is a class imbalance in our dataset, we chose to micro-average than the macro-average 
of all five classes which may lead to a different interpretation.   
 
Figure 13 Standalone SVM for MultiClass Precision-Recall Curves 
Figure 13 presents precision-recall curves based on a standalone SVM classifier 
for normalized inputs. An important measure in the above graph is the micro-average of 
precision-recall curves for all five classes by aggregating the contributions of the five 
classes to compute the average metric.  
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Figure 14 PCA+SVM MultiClass Precision-Recall Curves 
PCA-encoded inputs lead to a considerable increase in the micro-average of 
precision-recall, specifically from 0.59 to 0.63. It should be noted that our graphs also 
display iso curves at different f1 values. Iso-curves are convex-shaped curves that in 
this case follows a combination of precision and recall values for a given f1-score. The 
iso-curves gives us a reliable reference point to better understand the precision-recall 
curve.  
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Figure 15 AE+SVM MultiClass Precision-Recall Curves 
Figure 17 reflects data given from DAE inputs which are classified on SVM. The 
data indicates a much higher micro-average than the previous two models. Specifically, 
the area under the micro-average precision-recall is 0.72 which is 10 basis points higher 
than the previous model.  
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Performance Metrics  
Train and Test Time 
One of the most important features of a good model is the time and 
computational power that it requires to generate its predictions. We used the time 
module in python to measure the time it takes for our models to perform training and 
testing on the NSL-KDD dataset. The table below shows the training and testing time in 
seconds for the algorithms used in this paper.  
Based on our data, we can conclude that L1 regularized DAE coupled with SVM 
is the most time effective when dealing with binary class. Whereas, in the multi-class 
case, we find that DAE-SVM without any regularization term takes the least time to train 
and test the NSL-KDD dataset which gives us a clear answer to our initial research 
question that asks the effectiveness of an autoencoder based dimensionality reduction 
tool. A standalone support vector machine appears to take the longest time in both multi 
and binary class scenarios.  
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Table 10 
Train and Test Time based on Seconds 
Algorithm Training Time 
(sec)  
Testing Time 
(sec)  
Total Time 
(sec)  
Class 
SVM 392.70  39.68  432.38  Binary 
DAE-SVM 59.13 + 86.60  2.28  148.01  Binary 
DAE-SVM L1 52.55 + 90.49  2.80  145.84*2 Binary 
DAE-SVM L2 62.22 + 89.64  2.69  154.53 Binary 
SVM 1545.64 133.23 1,678.87 Multi-Class 
PCA-SVM 270.16 29.83 299.99 Multi-Class 
DAE-SVM 48.09 + 89.75 7.78 145.62* Multi-Class 
DAE-SVM L1 49.20 + 121.04 10.72 180.96 Multi-Class  
DAE-SVM L2 48.60 + 114.15 9.51 172.26* Multi-Class 
  
Conclusion 
The results yielded during this study have addressed all the topics posed earlier 
in the research question section. To recapitulate the findings of our research, we found 
DAE+SVM based neural network scheme being effective based on various classification 
 
 
2 * Algorithm that takes the least time to train and test on the NSL-KDD dataset.  
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and performance metrics. Autoencoders were much more effective at capturing useful 
properties of inputs which were demonstrated through t-SNE to embed higher 
dimension inputs on a two-dimensional plane and were compared to its linear PCA 
counterpart.   
Specifically, in terms of training and testing time, autoencoder encoded inputs 
proved to be much more time-efficient in the training and testing phase of the model. In 
addition, our proposed neural scheme proves to be better at classification metrics like 
the weighted average of Recall, F-score, and Accuracy in multi-class scenario 
compared to standalone SVM and PCA-encoded SVM.  
By focusing on metrics such as precision and recall, we were able to get a more 
refined perspective of our proposed neural scheme's performance by focusing on Type 
1 (False Positives) and Type II (False Negatives) errors. Since we are dealing with 
anomaly detection, more importance should be given to Type II error since allowing an 
anomaly to infiltrate through our intrusion detection system has the potential to wreak 
havoc on our system's resources.  
After rigorously examining the classification metrics, we can safely conclude the 
reliability and robustness of Autoencoders as a viable dimensionality reduction tool 
compared to PCA for anomaly detection based on NSL-KDD Dataset.  
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Appendix 
The appendix includes supplementary information regarding the study. The table in the 
appendix section contains a list of features that is present in the KDD 99 dataset. In the 
second exhibit, we see the attack types of KDD 99 further segmented to get a better 
picture of the dataset in question.  
List of Features in KDD 99 Dataset 
Feature Type No. Feature Name  Data Type 
Basic Features  1 Duration Continuous 
2 Protocol_type Symbolic 
3 Service Symbolic 
4 Flag Symbolic 
5 Src_bytes Continuous 
6 Dst_bytes Continuous 
7 Land Symbolic 
8 Wrong_fragment Continuous 
9 Urgent Continuous 
Content Features 10 Hot Continuous 
11 Num_failed_logins Continuous 
12 Logged in Symbolic 
13 Num_compromised  Continuous  
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14 Root_shell Continuous 
15 Su_attempted Continuous 
16 Num_root Continuous 
17 Num_file_creations Continuous 
18 Num_shells Continuous 
19 Num_access_files Continuous 
20 Num_outbound_cmds Continuous 
21 Is_host_login Symbolic 
22 Is_guest_login Symbolic 
Traffic Features 23 Count Continuous 
24 Srv_count Continuous 
25 Serror_rate Continuous 
26 Srv_serror_rate Continuous 
27 Rerror_rate Continuous 
28 Srv_rerror_rate Continuous 
29 Same_srv_rate  Continuous 
30 Diff_srv_rate Continuous 
31 Srv_diff_host_rate Continuous 
32 Dst_host_count Continuous 
33 Dst_host_srv_count Continuous 
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34 Dst_host_same_srv_rate  Continuous 
35 Dst_host_diff_srv_rate  Continuous 
36 Dst_host_same_src_port_rate Continuous 
37 Dst_host_same_src_host_rate Continuous 
38 Dst_host_serror_rate Continuous 
39 Dst_host_srv_serror_rate Continuous 
40 Dst_host_rerror_rate Continuous 
41 Dst_host_srv_rerror_rate Continuous 
 
Attack Types in KDDCUP99 dataset 
Denial of Service 
(DoS)  
User to Root 
(U2R) 
Remote to Local 
(R2L) 
Probing 
(Probe) 
Back Buffer Overflow FTP write IPSweep 
Land Load module Guess Password NMAP 
Neptune Perl IMAP Port Sweep 
Ping of Death Rootkit MultiHop Satan 
Smurf  Phf  
Teardrop  SPY  
  Warezclient  
  WarezMaster  
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